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ALL THINGS VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE: THE LOCATION OF
INTANGIBLE PROPERTY FOR RULE B ATTACHMENT PURPOSES
Kyle M. Brennan*
I. INTRODUCTION
For the recent history of admiralty law in the United States, attachment of a
defendant's assets under Rule B of the admiralty supplement to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure has been an invaluable tool for both obtaining
jurisdiction over absent defendants and obtaining security for pending arbitration
or litigation awards. As global shipping expands and iversifies, defendants in
this industry will become increasingly difficult to locate for jurisdictional
purposes; litigation and arbitration awards will also become more prominent. So
attachment of a party's assets located in a court's jurisdiction when that
defendant cannot be found in person will be an increasingly attractive procedural
device. The scope of property types seizable under this process will expand as
well.
Rule B of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows plaintiffs to attach
property located within a federal judicial district in the United States, provided
that the property's owner cannot be found in that district for purposes of process
or jurisdiction.' Rule B allows for attachment of both tangible and intangible
property.2 While case law abounds with examples of attachment of tangible
property, attachment of intangible property remains relatively novel and untested
within admiralty jurisprudence in the United States. Given the rise of global
shipping and the increasing use of intangible money as currency (for example,
wire transfers, promissory notes, letters of credit, etc.), the attachment of
intangible property under Rule B will almost certainly become an increasingly
common practice. Knowledge as to where such property might be considered
located for attachment purposes will help maritime practitioners in navigating
these kinds of cases.
This Article will explore Rule B case law for guidance on the location of
intangible property assets and, if none exists, will look to statutory law or
treatises on the relevant type of property. This Article will also rely heavily on
Articles 5, 8, and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.3 This Article will
examine intangible things of value that may have relevance to admiralty law,
including corporate stock shares, bank accounts, letters of credit, negotiable
* B.A. Lawrence University, 2011; J.D. DePaul University College of Law, 2014; L.L.M., Maritime
Law, Tulane University Law School, 2015. The author wishes to thank Professor Martin Davies of Tulane
Law School for his sage insight and guidance throughout the production of this article. Any opinions and
errors expressed herein are the author's own.
1. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. B.
2. Id.
3. The Uniform Commercial Code is codified by each state and is relevant in admiralty jurisdiction if
general maritime law is silent on a particular issue, which it is with regard to the location of commercial
instruments. See, e.g., Southworth Mach. Co., Inc. v. F/V Corey Pride, 994 F.2d 37, 40-41 (1st Cir. 1993);
Berge Helene Ltd. v. GE Oil & Gas, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 582, 597 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
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instruments, and intellectual property rights. Electronic fund transfers, the
attachment of which was outlawed in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit,4 will be examined insofar as case law has stated the location of
such funds and as a primer on the extent to which these transfers may shed light
on the location of bank accounts. Insurance policies, bills receivable, and other
types of intangible rights of action, including money due on a note and damages
due for a breach of contract or tort, will not be examined here.
II. THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF MONEY AND PROPERTY
Before delving into the specifics of intangible property and maritime rules
of attachment, it may be helpful to briefly explore the concept of money itself
from a more abstract perspective. In the mid-twentieth century, British scholar
F.A. Mann wrote a book called The Legal Aspects of Money that pondered
questions that had historically been taken for granted among legal scholars.5
Mann wanted to provide a fundamental overview of what money really was and
how it functioned under the law in its most reduced essence. Mann sought to
examine non-economic definitions of money and chose the following broad
definition: "The quality of money is to be attributed to all chattels which, issued
by the authority of the law and denominated with reference to a unit of account,
are meant to serve as universal means of exchange in the State of issue."6
Mann's book was eye opening because it revealed that what laypeople
consider money-the bank notes in our wallets or the coins in our purses-is not
money at all; it is merely paper and metal. Money, in the legal sense, is a
promise, or a debt, owed by a government and evidenced by a document that
indicates that the government will honor the amount stated in the document
based on the strength of its national currency. In other words, by issuing bank
notes, a government is telling the holder of that bank note that it will back the
amount stated thereon for any debt owed by the holder to any other person.7
Similarly, bank deposit accounts also do not contain money per se, but are rather
evidence of a debt that the bank owes to the customer in whose interest it
maintains that account.8 Mann's analysis also indicates that money is something
separate from credit, which would exist with a credit card or a charge card.9
Mann first coherently raised the issue of money as debt in a legal context.
This is significant because it indicates that many forms of valuable property that
laypeople think of as "money" (for example, bank notes, deposit accounts,
negotiable instruments, etc.) are really just paper and are only documentary
records of some kind of broader, inchoate right or relationship.
Characterizing money as a debt is a useful means of revealing the
4. Shipping Corp. of India v. Jaldhi Overseas PTE Ltd., 585 F.3d 58, 72 (2d Cir. 2009).
5. F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF MONEY (4th ed. 1982).
6. Id. at 8.
7. Id. at 9. See also MARK DUBOVEC, THE LAW OF SECURITIES, COMMODITIES, AND BANK ACCOUNTS
109-10 (2014) ("Currency is ... a bank note [issued by a government] that expresses a promise of the
government to pay the bearer on demand.").
8. MANN, supra note 5 at 5.
9. Id. at 8-11.
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relationship between the debtor and the beneficiary of the debt. The issue then
arises as to where such a debt is located. The most logical, perhaps painfully
obvious, answer to that question is that it is located wherever it exists. But
where is that? As a rule of thumb, and as inferred from Mann's The Legal
Aspects of Money, a debt really exists wherever it can be utilized or properly
disposed of by its right holder.10 This rule of thumb will be a recurring theme
throughout this Article. While Mann pondered the question of "what is
money?," this Article will focus on "where is money?," specifically money as
evidenced by some form of intangible property.
III. THE NATURE OF INTANGIBLE PROPERTY
Before discussing the location of intangible property for attachment
purposes, the nature of intangible property itself must first be solidified.
"Intangible property" is a subset of personal property that generally encompasses
all incorporeal rights."I Incorporeal rights include choses in action, which are
rights of action or, more specifically, rights of action evidenced by some kind of
document, such as chattel paper.12
Intangible property does not really entail a right related to a physical thing,
but rather evidences a relationship between persons or entities that the law
recognizes and will enforce.13 Intangible property, in and of itself, does not have
any physical existence, but is often evidenced by documentary intangibles, such
as stock certificates, letters of credit, and promissory notes.14
Given the amorphous nature of intangible property, a brief survey of
choice-of-law rules relating to intangible property may be instructive. The old
choice-of-law rule to be applied to intangible property is mobilia sequuntur
personam, or "the property follows the person."15 In other words, intangible
property has its situs at the domicile of the owner of that intangible property.16
This maxim is contrary to Rule B's function in admiralty because Rule B can
only be used to attach property located in a jurisdiction when its owner cannot be
found in personam. But mobilia sequuntur personam also states that a debt
follows the creditor and is located at the domicile of the creditor.17 This rule is
facile because an intangible, as evidence of an amorphous legal right of action,
exists everywhere and nowhere at the same time. Therefore, actual control over
an intangible is likely more important than the domicile of an intangible's owner.
The new choice-of-law rule for intangibles considers first the type of
intangible involved by way of determining its situs. For example, a promissory
note, as documentary proof of a promise to pay a certain sum of money, is
10. See id. at 67, 70-76.
11. 63C Am. Jur. 2d Property § 18 (citing Parsowith v. Dept. of Revenue, 723 A.2d 659, 206 (Pa.
1999)).
12. Id. § 23.
13. Id. § 9 (citing Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 365-66 (1939); Lucker Mfg. v. Home Ins. Co., 23
F.3d 808, 819 (3d Cir. 1994)).
14. Id.
15. See Campbell v. Bagley, 276 F.2d 28, 31 (5th Cir. 1960).
16. Id.
17. See Wilkins v. Ellett, 76 U.S. 740, 743 (1869).
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considered to be located where the note itself is located,1 8 while the location of
an un-certificated stock traded through an intermediary, as will be discussed in
detail below, exists where the intermediary trader is located.19
Intangible property for purposes of attaching such assets presents a unique
problem. Rule B attachment, as will be explained below, requires intangible
assets to be located in the federal judicial district in which attachment is sought.
By definition, however, intangible properties often have no physical location and
are mere evidence of obligations that often take documentary form. This raises a
number of possibilities for locating an intangible asset. The procedure for Rule
B attachment will shed further light on such possibilities.
IV. RULE B ATTACHMENT PROCEDURE
Before discussing the location of specific intangibles, a discussion of the
procedure for attachment of property under Rule B of the admiralty supplement
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is necessary. Rule B attachment is a
quasi in rem action used to obtain in personam jurisdiction over an absent
defendant. It is also used to obtain in rem financial security against a defendant
to satisfy future judgments.20 Rule B is a necessary tool of maritime law given
the highly transient and amorphous nature of this industry.2 1 As the Second
Circuit explained in Polar Shipping Limited v. Oriental Shipping Corporation:
A ship may be here today and gone tomorrow, not to return for
an indefinite period, perhaps never. Assets of its owner,
including debts for freights . .. within the jurisdiction today,
may be transferred elsewhere or paid off tomorrow. It is for
these reasons [that Rule B was] developed.2 2
Rule B attachment is a highly effective tool for plaintiffs because
attachment orders are granted ex parte and the plaintiff need not prove the merits
of its claim before obtaining an attachment.23  But Rule E(4)(f) of the
Supplemental Rules for Admiralty allows defendants to immediately contest
attachment before a district court judge.24  This balance makes Rule B a
powerful instrument for plaintiffs and also a relatively fair one for defendants.2 5
In order for a plaintiff to obtain a Rule B attachment order from a federal
judge, the plaintiff must satisfy four requirements.2 6 First, the plaintiff must
18. See In re Saddy, 129 N.Y.S. 163, 166 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954).
19. See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code §8-1 10(b); MAISIE 001, SHARES & OTHER CERTIFICATES IN
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 78 (2003).
20. Winter Storm Shipping Ltd. v. TPI, 310 F.3d 263, 268 (2d Cir. 2002).
21. See Vitol, S.A. v. Primerose Shipping Co., Ltd., 708 F.3d 527, 538 (4th Cir. 2013) (discussing the
prevalence of alter egos in the shipping industry).
22. Polar Shipping Limited v. Oriental Shipping Corporation, 680 F.2d 627, 637 (9th Cir. 1982).
23. Adam Gold, The Calm After the Storm? UCC Article 4A, Jaldhi, and the Future of Rule B
Attachment in the Second Circuit, 2 GEO. MASON J. INT'L COM. L. 14, 17-18 (2010).
24. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. E(4)(f).
25. Gold, supra note 23 at 17-18.
26. Aqua Stoli Shipping Ltd. v. Gardner Smith Pty Ltd., 460 F.3d 434, 445 (2d Cir. 2006); see also
Blue Whale Corp. v. Grand China Shipping Dev. Co., Ltd., 722 F.3d 488, 493 (2d Cir. 2013).
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establish that it has a prima facie claim in admiralty against the defendant.27
Second, the plaintiff must show, to the best of its knowledge, that the defendant
cannot be found within that federal judicial district for service of process or for
jurisdictional purposes.28 Third, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant's
property, be it tangible or intangible, can be found within that district.2 9 Fourth,
the plaintiff must state that no bar to attachment exists under statutory or
maritime law.3 0  Note also that a right to attachment cannot accrue until the
defendant comes into possession of the property to be attached or is about to
come into possession.3 1
Attachment of property under Rule B is a maritime remedy unique to the
United States. Many other jurisdictions around the world have in rem property
seizure, but not quasi in rem attachment of property.32 Attachment of property
arose in the United States because maritime defendants are often, by their
inherently international nature, more difficult to locate than defendants in a
traditional civil action.33 Thus, it is preferable to seize property in order to
compel an absent defendant o appear in court in the United States and to
guarantee assets in the event of a judgment against that defendant.3 4
With this context in mind, the location of different intangibles for purposes
of Rule B attachment will be better illuminated.
V. THE LOCATION OF INTANGIBLE PROPERTIES
A. Corporate Shares
Attachment of corporate shares under Rule B of the supplemental rules for
admiralty is a relatively novel concept. Little case law exists on attachment of
this property type, but the location of corporate shares has been thoroughly
documented through Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code and from a
range of case law. Corporate shares, as evidenced by documents such as stock
certificates, are valuable ownership interests in the capital of corporations and
therefore represent a powerful mechanism for maritime plaintiffs to assert under
Rule B.
1. What is a share?
Corporate shares are fundamental evidence of an ownership interest in a
27. Aqua Stoli, 460 F.3d at 445; see also Seawind Compania, S.A. v. Crescent Line, Inc., 320 F.2d 580,
582 (2d Cir. 1963).
28. Aqua Stoli, 460 F.3d at 445. "Jurisdiction" under this prong means the traditional "minimum
contacts" with a forum needed for in personam jurisdiction. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
29. Aqua Stoli, 460 F.3d at 445.
30. Id.
31. Reibor Int'l, Ltd. v. Cargo Carriers (KACZ-CO), Ltd., 759 F.2d 262, 268 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding
that after-acquired property clauses do not grant a maritime defendant a property interest that can be attached
by a plaintiff in property that the defendant has not yet acquired).
32. See William Tetley, Arrest, Attachment, & Related Maritime Law Procedures, 73 TUL. L. REV.
1895 (June 1999).
33. Aqua Stoli, 543 F.3d at 443.
34. Id.
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corporation.35 Stocks as property entail two separate things: (1) the corporate
ownership interest itself and (2) the physical certificate evidencing that interest.
English law regards share certificates as mere evidence of title, whereas New
York law regards those same certificates as negotiable instruments in and of
themselves and also as a physical embodiment of the share.3 6 Shares are choses
in action, or, as discussed above, personal property that is intangible, and one's
rights therein can only be exercised through legal action.37 In other words, a
corporate share is a documentary intangible evidencing a contractual ownership
right in a corporate entity that the law of the relevant jurisdiction is willing to
enforce. In this regard, shares are analogous to any other type of personal
property in that they can be bought, sold, pledged, encumbered, and so forth.3 8
2. Development of the Modem Securities System
The modem system of trading and holding corporate securities is unique.
Under the old system, existing during the early years of modem industry and
corporations, a corporation issued shares of corporate ownership via transfer of a
physical certificate to the new owner of that share; delivery of the certificate was
a key transaction.39 This system proved problematic for bookkeeping purposes,
but still exists with some smaller, privately owned corporations.40 Use of un-
certificated securities developed in the 1970s as a response to this old system of
physical certificate delivery and allowed the issuer of a share to record
ownership of that share on its books without passing along a physical certificate
to an owner; recording the transaction was all that was needed.4 1 The practice of
a corporation recording ownership of shares itself, and either issuing or not
issuing certificates to owners of those shares, is referred to as the "direct holding
system" for securities.
The "indirect holding system" for securities developed in the late 1970s and
remains the most archetypal system for trading corporate shares in modem
commerce. Under this system, a corporate issuer of shares sends share
certificates to a clearinghouse corporation, called the Depository Trust Company
(DTC).4 2 These shares are registered and immobilized with the DTC and the
DTC is listed as the registered owner of the shares on the books of the issuer.43
The DTC then transfers the shares to brokerage firms or investment banks, called
intermediaries, which in turn sell those shares to investors.44 The DTC lists the
relevant intermediary as the owner of those shares on its books and the
35. 001, supra note 19 at 44-45.
36. Id. at 45 (citing British Companies Act of 1985; New York Uniform Commercial Code § 8-105
(2001)).
37. Id. at 46.
38. SANDRA M. ROCKS & CARL S. BJERNE, THE ABCS OF THE UCC ARTICLE 8: INVESTMENT
SECURITIES 30 (Amelia H. Boss ed. 1997).
39. Id. at 1.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2.
42. Id. at 9.
43. Id. at 9.
44. Id.
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intermediary lists the investor as the owner on its books.45 As a result, the issuer
of the shares usually has no idea which individual investors actually own its
stock.46
In the indirect holding system, investors retain a "security entitlement" in
the shares they purchase from the intermediary, which is defined as a bundle of
rights (including, inter alia, property rights in the underlying security, rights
against third parties, and in personam rights of action against the intermediary)
held by an entitlement holder that can be asserted against the relevant
intermediary and others in relation to a financial asset.47 The intermediary in
turn retains a "securities account" on behalf of the investor, which allows the
intermediary to credit the account of the investor and otherwise dispose of shares
held in that account as an agent of the investor.48 With a clearer understanding
of both the direct and indirect holding systems for securities, the situs of those
shares for purposes of choice-of-law rules and attachment will become more
intuitive.
3. The Location of Corporate Shares
Given the dichotomous nature of corporate shares (i.e., as an intangible
ownership interest and as evidence of that interest in documentary form), their
physical location is not self-evident. Thus, a choice-of-law analysis for
corporate shares may shed some light on possibilities for the location of
corporate shares. The first possibility is the lex situs rule, or the physical
location of the corporate share.49 By definition, however, a corporate share is
fundamentally a right-duty relationship and as such has no physical location.50
The situs of shares then becomes subject to concepts such as corporate residence,
the location of certificates evidencing that share, and so forth.51 The second
possibility will be the lex incorporationis rule, or the place of the issuer's
incorporation. Under English law, the lex incorporationis rule is the law to be
applied to corporate shareS.52 This view has also been incorporated in New
York and Canadian case law.53 Other choice-of-law possibilities include the law
of the situs of the stock register54 and the law of the place of the corporate share
transaction (lex loci actus).55
In the United States, the old rule regarding choice-of-law for corporate
45. Id. at 3.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 40.
48. Id. at 43.
49. 001, supra note 19 at 13-16.
50. Id. at 14.
51. Id. at 15.
52. Id. at 17 (citing Macmillan Inc. v. Bishopsgate Investment Trust PLC (No. 3) [1996] 1 WLR 387).
See JOANNA BENJAMIN, INTERESTS IN SECURITIES: A PROPRIETARY LAW ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SECURITIES MARKETS (2000) (providing an in-depth analysis of English law and international law relating to
securities).
53. Oliner v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 311 N.Y.S.2d 429, 432-33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970); Brown v.
Beleggings-Societeit (1961) 29 DLR (3d) 673.
54. 001, supra note 19 at 26-33.
55. Id. at 34-38.
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shares was that the law of the situs of the corporation applied in all situations.56
This rule was eventually rendered outdated as disputes over corporate shares
began to turn more on the shares as property, as opposed to documents relating
to corporate governance.57 The location of the stock certificates themselves
becomes the applicable choice-of-law provision for disputes regarding those
shares as property.58
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code is consistent with this result.
Section 112 of Article 8 gives creditors a right of action to levy or attach shares
held by a debtor.59 The purpose of this provision is to prevent the transfer of
stock bearing encumbrances not facially obvious.60  Under this section,
certificated stock is located where the certificate itself is located.6 1
Uncertificated stock is located where the issuing chief executive officer is
located.62 Security entitlements in stocks, or accounts held by an intermediary,
are located where the intermediary is located.63 Securities held by an Article 9
secured party are located where the secured party is located.64 This form of
attachment under Section 8-112 is the commercial law equivalent of Rule B
attachment, and its pronouncements on corporate share situs should be
considered instructive here. No evidence exists that admiralty law has adopted,
or would adopt, a set of rules for corporate share situs different from those stated
in the Uniform Commercial Code.
One interesting wrinkle in the location of corporate shares is the
prominence of the intermediary holding system for stock trading, as explained
above. Shares traded through intermediaries are uncertificated shares, and the
generally accepted rule internationally with regard to uncertificated shares is that
they are located where the intermediary is located.65 This is the so-called
"PRIMA Rule" thesis advanced by Singaporean legal scholar Maisie Ooi.66
This rule is logically correct because having control over a security entails being
able to dispose of that security without further action from the issuer or
transferor of that security.67 In the direct holding system, the person possessing
that control would be the investor, but in the indirect holding system that person
is the intermediary because the investor in the indirect holding system cannot act
on the security without further action from the intermediary.68
56. Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 5101 (citing Jellinik v. Huron Copper Mining
Co., 177 U.S. 1, 12 (1900)).
57. Id. § 5101.
58. Id. But see Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 169 (1967) (requiring all stock in Delaware corporations to be
considered located in Delaware for choice of law purposes, regardless of the location of the certificates).
59. U.C.C. § 8-112 (1994).
60. Fletcher Cyclopedia, supra note 56 at § 5104 (citing Calista Corp. v. Deyoung, 562 P.2d 338, 345
(Alaska 1977)).
61. U.C.C. § 8-112(a); see also Iron Pasha v. Shanghai Grand China Shipping Co., 2013 AMC 2540




65. 001, supra note 19 at 48, 78; accord U.C.C. § 8-112(c); ROCKS & BJERNE, supra note 38 at 103.
66. 001, supra note 19 at 78.
67. ROCKS & BJERNE, supra note 38 at 32.
68. See id.
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In the indirect holding system, the intermediary is located wherever the
intermediary maintains the office identified in the relevant securities account
statement as serving the investor's account, or, if not applicable, wherever the
intermediary's chief executive officer is located.69 For choice-of-law purposes,
the local law of the intermediary will govern most disputes related to securities
traded through the indirect holding system.70
4. Attachment of Corporate Shares under Rule B: A Case Analysis
Attachment of corporate shares is a relatively unchartered area of Rule B
jurisprudence. A recent and instructive example of attachment of corporate
shares under Rule B, Iron Pasha v. Shanghai Grand Shipping Co., illustrates
some principles relating to a United States court's interpretation of the location
of shares.]1
The plaintiff in Iron Pasha levied a Rule B attachment order against several
defendants to obtain security for a pending English arbitration award relating to a
breached charter party agreement.7 2 The plaintiff seized $1.3 million worth of
stock in Hainan Airlines allegedly held by one of the defendants in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington.73 That defendant failed to
respond to the attachment for more than one year, at which point the court
ordered Hainan Airlines to mark this encumbrance on the defendant's stock
certificates.7 4 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and a
motion to vacate the attachment on the grounds that the shares at issue were not
located within the Western District of Washington and that the court therefore
lacked jurisdiction.7 5 Hainan Airlines is a Chinese corporation that trades its
stock on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.7 6 The shareholder defendant in Iron
Pasha was also domiciled in China and held its Hainan Airlines stock
certificates in China.77
The court in Iron Pasha held that the shares being attached were not located
in the Western District of Washington and granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss and the motion to vacate attachment for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.7 8 The court reasoned that, under a choice-of-law analysis, China
had the most significant contacts to that dispute because (a) the relevant
corporation is Chinese, (b) the stock exchange is Chinese, and (c) the defendant
69. Id. at 104.
70. U.C.C. § 8-110(b) (1994).
71. 2013 AMC 2540 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
72. Id. at 2541-42.
73. Id. at 2542. The plaintiffs basis for seizing shares of Hainan Airlines in the Western District of
Washington was that the shares were a debt owed by Hainan Airlines, a company that maintained flights
between Seattle and China, and therefore followed Hainan Airlines wherever it went. See Reply Brief for
Plaintiff at 5, Iron Pasha v. Shanghai Grand China Shipping Co., 2013 AMC 2540 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (No.
C 12-062 1); Plaintiffs Response to Motion to Quash at 9, Iron Pasha v. Shanghai Grand China Shipping Co.,
2013 AMC 2540 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (No. C120-0621).
74. Iron Pasha, 2013 AMC at 2542-43.
75. Id. at 2544.
76. Id. at 2546.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2544.
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is Chinese and held the shares at issue in China.79
The plaintiff in Iron Pasha argued that U.S. law should govern that dispute
because the law of the forum governs Rule B disputes; the court in that case
dismissed this argument as tautological because the law of the forum cannot also
be used to determine if the court has subject matter jurisdiction.80 The court
reasoned that, even if U.S. law applied, Chinese law would govern under a
choice-of-law analysis because U.S. law would recognize that the shares were
located where the corporation was domiciled or where it has its principal place
of business, both of which would be China.81 Under either Chinese or U.S. law,
the stock at issue was located in China, and the Western District of Washington
lacked jurisdiction to hear a Rule B dispute.82
5. Implications of Rule B Attachment for the Direct and Indirect Holding
Systems
Returning to the intermediary holding system, when shares are traded
through intermediaries, the stocks are considered located where the intermediary
is domiciled or has its principal place of business. For attachment purposes, this
will almost always be the Southern District of New York due to the prevalence
of brokering and investment banking there. The result in Iron Pasha is
interesting because the stocks there may have been traded on the Shanghai Stock
Exchange. This poses problems for plaintiffs pursuing Rule B attachment in the
United States. If it becomes common for foreign stock exchanges to pervade
stock transfers, Rule B can become increasingly difficult in the United States.
This is because the shares, assuming that Maisie Ooi's PRIMA Rule theory
(which states that the location of the intermediary governs disputes about those
shares) is correct, are unlikely to be "located" in any judicial district in the
United States.
Also, if certificated shares are considered to be located where the issuing
corporation is incorporated, under the lex incorporationis rule, the District of
Delaware is likely to be the forum in which to attach certificated securities.
6. Summary of Corporate Shares
If a maritime plaintiff wishes to attach corporate shares held by a defendant,
that plaintiff must first determine whether the shares are held in the direct or
indirect holding system. If the shares are traded through a direct holding system,
certificated shares (i.e. shares possessing an actual physical certificate of
ownership) can be attached only in the jurisdiction in which the physical
certificate is located. If they are uncertificated shares, the shares can be attached
where the issuing corporation's chief executive officer is located because this
will be where the records evidencing the investor's ownership of those shares
can be found. If the shares are traded through an indirect holding system, as they
79. Id. 2545-46.
80. Id. at 2546-47.
81. Id. at 2548 (citing Jellenik v. Hurron Copper-Mining Co. 177 U.S. 1, 13 (1900); Writ Franklin
Petroleum Corp. v. Gruen, 139 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1944)).
82. Id. at 2549-50.
249
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
likely will be, the plaintiff will need to attach shares wherever the intermediary
holding those shares is located. This will be either (a) the location where the
intermediary has the office that maintains the investor's account, as indicated on
the investor's account receipt, or (b) the location of the intermediary's chief
executive office.
B. Electronic Fund Transfers
Another intangible of value is the electronic fund transfer (EFT). During
the first decade of the twenty-first century, attachment of EFTs under Rule B in
New York was a hot topic issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit subsequently outlawed the attachment of EFTs and, given the prevalence
of EFTs through banks located in New York, much of the following discussion
is hypothetical for this reason. But a number of cases involving attachment of
EFTs under Rule B, while this practice was still permissible, discussed the
location of EFTs. Further, while attachment of EFTs in the Second Circuit has
been outlawed, this practice theoretically remains legal throughout the rest of the
United States. Therefore, an examination of cases on Rule B attachment of
EFTs will provide valuable insight into this type of commercial property.
EFTs are wire transfers from one bank to another, often through an
intermediary bank that is located in New York.83 EFTs are generally regarded as
pending debts owed by the sending bank to the beneficiary of the transfer.84
Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code governs wire transfers such as
EFTs and distinguishes a mere "fund transfer" from a "payment order."85 The
latter involves an order from one bank to credit the account of a client, while the
former involves the same transaction but through an intermediary bank; EFTs
are an example of the former.86 Given New York's prominence as a financial
hub, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, and the New York state courts have particular
expertise in this area of commercial law.
The Second Circuit's foray into Rule B attachment of EFTs began with that
court's decision in Winter Storm Shipping Ltd. v. TPL 87 In Winter Storm, the
plaintiff, a Maltese company, chartered a vessel to the defendant, a Thai
company, and later filed a Rule B attachment action in New York against the
defendant when it failed to pay the full amount of the charter.88 Pursuant to that
attachment order, the relevant bank in New York put a stop on incoming funds
destined from the defendant.89 The defendant eventually wired funds through
that bank from Thailand intended for a bank in Scotland; the bank deducted the
amount specified in the attachment order and allowed the remaining sum to pass
83. See GOLD, supra note 23 at 19-22 (providing discussion of EFTs under New York law).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 18-19, 32-37.
86. Id.
87. 310 F.3d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 2002).
88. Id. at 265-66.
89. Id. at 266.
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along to Scotland.90
The Second Circuit in Winter Storm held that EFTs were property located
within a judicial district and were thus subject to seizure under Rule B.9 1 The
court reasoned that Rule B is a broad remedy and does not exclude electronic
transactions, even though they pass through a judicial district for only a second,
and also relied on the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Daccarett, a
non-maritime case which held that EFTs are property subject to civil forfeiture.92
The defendants in the Daccarett decision argued in 1993 that EFTs were only
communications between a sending bank and a beneficiary bank and only
became "property" once received by the beneficiary bank.93 The Second Circuit
disagreed with that argument and held that "an EFT while it takes the form of a
bank credit at an intermediary bank is clearly a seizable res under the forfeiture
statute;" the panel in Winter Storm found this reasoning persuasive as it applied
to Rule B attachment.9 4
The Second Circuit's decision in Winter Storm, which created powerful
precedent for admiralty plaintiffs in holding that EFTs were attachable property
at New York banks, created a flurry of litigation between 2002 and 2009.95
Concern arose that shipping interests would no longer conduct business using
U.S. dollars or New York banks.9 6 The New York banking industry also began
to complain about the increasing burden being placed on it by these attachment
orders.97 Cases within the Second Circuit between 2002 and 2009 continued
applying the holding in Winter Storm while also reining in that decision's
expansive scope.9 8
In Shipping Corp. of India v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd., a three-judge panel
of the Second Circuit reversed the decision in Winter Storm and prohibited
attachment of EFTs in that circuit.99 There, the plaintiff filed a Rule B
attachment order on the defendant's incoming EFT in order to recover funds due
on a charter party.10 0 The Second Circuit held that Winter Storm was wrongly
decided because (a) it was based on erroneous reasoning and (b) it had a
burdensome effect on the New York financial industry and federal court
system.101 The court there based its holding, in large part, on the Winter Storm
decision's flawed reliance on Daccarett, which the Jaldhi court reasoned merely
90. Id.
91. Id. at 278.
92. Id. at 275-76 (citing U.S. v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 55 (2d Cir. 1993)).
93. Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 55.
94. Id.; see also Winter Storm, 310 F.3d at 277-78.
95. See Jillian Benda, Comment, No Calm After the Storm: The Rise of the Rule B Attachment Cottage
Industry, 31 TUL. MAR. L.J. 95 (2006); Ian F. Taylor, Comment, Maritime Madness: Rule B, Electronic Fund
Transfers, Maritime Contracts, and The Explosion of Admiralty Litigation in the Southern District of New
York, 34 TUL. MAR. L.J. 211 (2009).
96. See Gold, supra note 23 at 40-41.
97. Id.
98. See Aqua Stoli Shipping Ltd. v. Gardner Smith Pty Ltd., 460 F.3d 434, 445-46 (2d Cir. 2006);
Consub Delaware LLC v. Schahin Engenharia Limitada, 543 F.3d 104, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2008).
99. 585 F.3d 58, 58 (2d Cir. 2009).
100. Id. at 64-65.
101. Id. at 68, 71.
251
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
held that EFTs could be forfeited if traceable to illegal activity, not that EFTs
were property of a beneficiary while still in transit.10 2 The court distinguished
Rule B from civil forfeiture on the basis that the former is a quasi in rem remedy
while the latter is a pure in rem remedy; the two are thus distinguishable.103 The
Jaldhi court further cited to New York state law, which explicitly does not
recognize EFTs as property.10 4
The Second Circuit in Jaldhi explicitly stated that Winter Storm was both
wrongly decided and unduly burdensome to both the judicial system and the
backbone of the New York economy-the finance industry. An issue exists,
however, as to whether Jaldhi actually did overturn Winter Storm.105 Jaldhi was
a decision of a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit reversing a previous
decision of that same circuit. A federal appellate court decision can be
overturned by either (a) an en banc hearing of that same circuit or (b) a decision
of the United States Supreme Court.10 6 The panel in Jaldhi nonetheless stated
that its decision should carry the force of an en banc ruling because it was a
"mini en banc" decision, in which the panel judges sent drafts of their decision
to all other judges on that circuit and, apparently, received no objections.107 An
argument could be made that an informal "mini en banc" decision does not grant
a three-judge panel the authority to overrule circuit precedent.'0 8 With that in
mind, it is possible that Jaldhi, despite its vehemence, never properly overruled
the Winter Storm decision.
Assuming Jaldhi did effectively overrule its own circuit precedent, an issue
exists as to whether the Second Circuit in Jaldhi made an effective legal
argument. First, Jaldhi arguably conflates commercial law and admiralty law by
relying so heavily on Article 4A of the New York Uniform Commercial Code.
Second, the court bases much of its holding on an amicus brief submitted by The
Clearing House Association LLC, which is an advocacy group for the banking
industry.109 The amicus brief states the myriad of ways in which banks in New
York were inconvenienced by the flurry of EFT attachment orders since the
Winter Storm decision.1 10The Jaldhi court almost certainly caved to the whims
of the banking industry. The burden on financial institutions due to increased
processing of attachment orders was likely overplayed somewhat and should not
have interfered with the ability of a court sitting in admiralty to seize
increasingly transient international assets. Jaldhi also left open the question as
to the property ownership of EFTs held by an intermediary bank.1 11  For the
time being, however, Rule B attachment of EFTs in the Second Circuit is not
102. Id. at 68-69.
103. Id. at 69.
104. Id. at 70 (citing N.Y. U.C.C. § 4-A-503).
105. Id. at 71.
106. See Gold, supra note 23 at 58-60.
107. Jaldhi, 585 F.3d at 67.
108. See Gold, supra note 23 at 58-60.
109. Jaldhi, 585 F.3d at 62.
110. Id.
111. See Gold, supra note 23 at 23, 32-35 (arguing that N.Y. U.C.C. Article 4A does not allow any entity
to have a property interest in an EFT).
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permitted.
One issue touched on in Winter Storm and its progeny, and not substantially
disrupted by Jaldhi, was that EFTs are located, at least for hypothetical
attachment purposes, where the intermediary bank is located.112 The Second
Circuit in Jaldhi never explicitly said that EFTs were not property located within
a judicial district-it merely held that EFTs were not property of the defendant
for purposes of Rule B attachment.113 In other words, it focused on the "what"
and not the "where" when it overruled Winter Storm.
For this reason, a district court outside of the Second Circuit would not be
bound by the decision in Jaldhi that EFTs are not subject to Rule B attachment
and could allow such attachment over EFTs passing through other financial
centers besides New York. In practical terms, this is unlikely to happen given
the prevalence of major banks that have headquarters in New York.
One theory for attachment of EFTs could be that these funds are attachable
wherever they are converted into U.S. dollars. Clearinghouse banks, which
represent banks that process EFTs, buy U.S. dollars from the Federal Reserve
Bank. The Federal Reserve Bank maintains twelve branches throughout the
United States located in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Kansas
City, Minneapolis, New York, Philadelphia, Richmond, San Francisco, and St.
Louis. The argument could be advanced that attachment of EFTs could be made
wherever the individual Federal Reserve branch is located that converted the
EFT into U.S. dollars.
It is unlikely, however, that another federal appellate circuit would be
willing to disregard the Second Circuit's fairly emphatic holding in Jaldhi on
this issue. At any rate, attachment of EFTs under Rule B outside of the Second
Circuit has not been tested and will not be binding on other circuit courts until
the United States Supreme Court speaks on this issue. Such a process could
theoretically be permissible because an EFT, while passing through the United
States, is located wherever the intermediary bank is located.
C. Bank Accounts
This article's discussion of electronic fund transfers and corporate shares
segues well into attachment of bank accounts under Rule B. Bank accounts are
depositories of personal and corporate assets. Bank accounts are essentially a
debt owed by a bank to a client.114 While a layperson would likely assume that
funds he or she deposits into a bank remain at that physical bank location, those
funds are really just intangibles held by that bank; the deposited money itself has
no physical location. A judge for the Southern District of New York observed
the bizarre nature of this everyday phenomenon: "In this weird age, the location
of an intangible, especially a bank account, is a metaphysical question. By and
large, bank deposits exist as electronic impulses embedded in silicon chips. In a
sense, therefore, bank funds are both everywhere and nowhere."1 15
112. Winter Storm Shipping Ltd. v. TPI, 310 F.3d 263, 278 (2d Cir. 2002); Jaldhi, 585 F.3d at 71.
113. Jaldhi, 585 F.3d at 71.
114. See MANN, supra note 5 at 5.
115. Yayasan Sabah Dua Shipping v. Scandinavian Liquid Carriers, 335 F. Supp. 2d 441, 448 (S.D.N.Y.
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A bank account is defined as "any deposit or credit account with a bank,
including a demand, time, savings, passbook, share draft, or like account, other
than an account evidenced by a certificate of deposit."ll6 Bank accounts can be
either regular (special) deposit accounts (i.e., for keeping of valuables in a safe
deposit box) or irregular (general) (i.e., for accumulation of credit in the account
of a customer at a bank through the lending of funds to that bank).117 Bank
accounts as payment systems utilize documents-namely, checks or payment
orders-which represent an obligation or a promise to pay the bearer of that
document.118 These documents, as monetary obligations, are not the money
itself, but still form the core of this payment system, which is really comprised
of intangible credits and debits within bank accounts. 119
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code states that the method of
perfecting a security interest in a deposit account is through control of that
account, often through an agreement between a creditor, a debtor, and the
debtor's bank to grant the creditor a property interest in that deposit account.120
Control is, indeed, the only method of perfecting a security interest in a bank
account.121 Control can arise under Section 9-314(a) of Article 9 through an
agreement between the secured party, the debtor, and the bank wherein the bank
agrees to comply with instructions from the secured party.
Control over a bank account for security interest purposes is significant
with regard to the location of a bank account because "control" under Article 9 is
often exercised by a contractual relationship between persons (similar to a chose
in action, a typical intangible) and not a possessory interest over a tangible thing.
In other words, to control a bank account, one must levy control over the bank as
a corporate, intangible whole and not exercise possession over the precise,
tangible funds deposited into that bank, as would be sufficient for perfection of
other types of property under Article 9, such as goods.122
1. The Location of Bank Accounts for Attachment Purposes
The location of bank accounts has enormous future implications for Rule B
attachment. Bank account attachments have not been a major issue for Rule B
purposes to date, but it is likely to be in the near future as plaintiffs in admiralty
attempt to secure increasingly illusive funds. Courts have held that bank
accounts are clearly seizable res under Rule B.1 23
2. The Separate Entity Rule for Accounts in Bank Branches
Maritime plaintiffs seeking attachment of bank accounts under Rule B have
2004), rejected on other grounds by Aqua Stoli Shipping Ltd. v. Gardner Smith Pty Ltd., 460 F.3d 434 (2d Cir.
2006).
116. U.C.C. § 4-104(a)(1); accord U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(29).
117. DUBOVEC, supra note 7 at 120-21.
118. Id. at 87; see also MANN, supra note 5 at 5.
119. DUBOVEC, supra note 7 at 87.
120. U.C.C. § 9-104, 9-314(a).
121. Id. §9-312(b).
122. See id. § 9-310(b)(6).
123. See, e.g., Aurora Maritime Co. v. Abdullah Mohamed Fahem & Co., 85 F.3d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1996).
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a strong interest in determining the exact branch at which the defendant
maintains the account to be attached because of the existence of the so-called
"Separate Entity Rule" in some jurisdictions in the United States. The Separate
Entity Rule states that branches of a bank are considered to be separate banks for
purposes of, inter alia, attachment of bank accounts.124 Therefore, attachment
must be had on the actual branch where the defendant maintains this account.125
This rule is a facet of New York commercial law and is followed in the Second
Circuit. 126
The Separate Entity Rule was first stated in Det Bergenske
Dampskibsselskab v. Sabre Shipping Company, a case involving a Rule B writ of
attachment served on the defendant's bank in Brooklyn to reach funds in an
account at that bank maintained in Manhattan.127 The court held that the writ of
attachment on a bank branch in the Eastern District of New York was
insufficient to reach funds held at a branch of the same bank located within the
Southern District of New York.128 Service on the bank would have had to have
been done in the district in which the defendant's account was actually
maintained by that bank.129 Courts in the Second Circuit and in New York state
court have continued to reaffirm the Separate Entity Rule.130 The Separate
Entity Rule is also followed in the United Kingdom.131 And district courts in
other circuits have also applied the Separate Entity Rule.132
A number of jurisdictions do not follow the Separate Entity Rule and
instead hold essentially that attachment of funds at a branch in one jurisdiction is
sufficient to reach funds held anywhere that bank can be found.133 For example,
124. Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 341 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1965).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 52.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See generally Parbulb II A/S v. Heritage Mar., S.A., 935 N.Y.S. 2d 829 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011)
(affirming the Separate Entity Rule); Limonium Mar., S.A. v. Mizushima Marinera, S.A., 961 F. Supp. 600
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (upholding the Separate Entity Rule and holding that a writ of attachment on a New York
bank was insufficient to reach funds in that bank held in Scotland); Nat. Shipping & Trading Corp. v. Weeks
Stevedoring Co., 252 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (affirming the Separate Entity Rule); D/S A/S Flint v.
Sabre Shipping Corp., 228 F. Supp. 384 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) (holding prior to Bergenske that funds do not have a
situs in a bank account in a district other than the district containing the branch maintaining that account);
Hohenstein Shipping Co. v. Feliz Compania Naviera, S.A., 236 F. Supp. 216 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
131. See Richardson v. Richardson [1927] Prob. 228.
132. Sara Lee Corp. v. Gregg, 2004 WL 23120116, at *3 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (adopting the Separate Entity
Rule); see generally Desert Wide Cabling & Installation v. Wells Fargo, 958 P.2d 457 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998);
see also Woodlands, Ltd. v. Westwoods Ins. Co., Ltd., 965 F. Supp. 13, 15 (D. Md. 1997) (holding that
attachment of funds at a bank branch in Maryland was insufficient to reach funds held in an account at the
same bank at a branch in Virginia); see generally Shinto Shipping Co. v. Fibrex & Shipping Co., 425 F. Supp.
1088 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
133. See, e.g., Marisco, Ltd. v. Am. Samoa Government, 889 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1250 (D. Haw. 2012)
(stating that the Hawaii Supreme Court would deem the Separate Entity Rule obsolete and would not adopt this
rule); see also Acme Contracting, Ltd. v. Toltest Inc., 2008 WL 4534175, at *7 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (speculating
that the Michigan Supreme Court would reject he Separate Entity Rule) ("such a rule is entirely obsolete in
today's world of highly sophisticated and centralized banking operations"); Tribie v. United Dev. Group Intern.
LLC, 2008 WL 5120769, at *3 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (stating that Florida does not recognize the Separate Entity
Rule); In re Marriage of Kosmond, 830 N.E.2d 596, 601 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (stating that Illinois does not
recognize the Separate Entity Rule) (citing Bank of Montreal v. Clark, 108 Ill. App. 163, 166-67 (1903)).
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in Day v. Temple Drilling Co., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Mississippi held that a debt can be attached under Rule B wherever the debtor
can be found for purposes of personal jurisdiction.134 As noted previously in
this Article, bank accounts held by a bank are essentially debts owed by the bank
to the depositing client. Therefore, under the holding in Day, a bank account
exists wherever the depository bank can be found for personal jurisdiction
purposes. A bank can be found for personal jurisdiction purposes wherever it
has a branch office. Thus, a bank account can be attached in any district in
which that bank maintains a branch.
This rule, and not the Separate Entity Rule, seems logically correct given
the modem realities of banking. Bank accounts are really electronic credits
existing in favor of the holder of that bank account against the bank. In a sense,
those credits exist everywhere and nowhere at the same time. The branch at
which a customer maintains a bank account is entirely arbitrary given that funds
from this account can be credited to the customer at any other branch of that
bank. But given the continuing existence of the Separate Entity Rule for bank
branches, maritime plaintiffs should know whether the jurisdiction in which they
seek Rule B attachment of a bank account follows this rule and, if so, where the
exact branch office that maintains the relevant account is located.
3. Ancillary Problems for Attachment of Bank Accounts
In addition to considerations stemming from the Separate Entity Rule, some
recent cases have shed light on additional problems for maritime plaintiffs who
are attaching bank accounts under Rule B. The Southern District of New York
in Yayasan Sabah Dua Shipping v. Scandinavian Liquid Carriers stated that a
bank account exists, in the case of a bank with a domestic office located in New
York and a fictitious offshore office in the Cayman Islands, at the bank's
domestic office because, given that the Cayman branch was essentially a ghost
office, control over that account effectively existed in New York. 13 5 In addition,
the Second Circuit in Allied Maritime, Inc. v. Descatrade S.A. held that funds
held by an Indian bank that had a branch office in New York did not confer
jurisdiction on the district court for a Rule B attachment of funds if those funds
were not actually held at the New York branch.13 6 Allied Maritime is likely an
outlier and would presumably only apply to small, foreign banks with transient
presence in the United States. The Southern District of New York also held in
Alaska Reefer Management LLC v. Network Shipping Ltd. that property of the
defendant must actually exist in an account at the time of attachment.13 7 Courts
have held that secured lines of credit are not attachable property because a line of
credit is "nothing more than a privilege to incur a debt."1 3 8 Last, a defendant's
134. Day v. Temple Drilling Co., 613 F. Supp. 194, 196-97 (S.D. Miss. 1985).
135. 335 F. Supp. 2d 441, 448-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) rejected on other grounds by Aqua Stoli Shipping
Ltd. v. Gardner Smith Pty Ltd., 460 F.3d 434 (2d Cir. 2006).
136. 620 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2006).
137. 68 F. Supp. 3d 383, 388-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that funds transferred into a defendant's
account solely through the clerical error of the bank could not be attached under Rule B).
138. Oceanfocus Shipping, Ltd. v. Naviera Humboldt, S.A., 962 F. Supp. 1481, 1482-83 (S.D. Fla.
1996).
256
ALL THINGS VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE
property held in a bank account maintained by an agent of the defendant for the
defendant's benefit can be attached under Rule B.1 39
4. Summary of Bank Accounts
Under Rule B, a bank account in a jurisdiction that follows the Separate
Entity Rule can only be attached in the district in which the relevant branch
office maintaining the defendant's account is located. If the jurisdiction does not
follow the Separate Entity Rule, attachment can be had in any district in which
the bank that maintains the defendant's account maintains a branch office.
D. Letters of Credit
Letters of credit are another area in which Rule B attachment may become
prevalent. A letter of credit is a "definite undertaking . . . by an issuer to a
beneficiary . . . to honor a documentary presentation by payment or delivery of
an item of value"1 40 and is governed by Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. A letter of credit transaction involves three parties: (1) an applicant;141
(2) an issuer;14 2 and (3) a beneficiary.14 3 In practice the transaction will work as
follows: an applicant will go to a bank (the issuer) to obtain a letter of credit
from that bank to serve as a form of payment to be provided to a designated
party (the beneficiary) in exchange for the sale of goods or the provision of
services between the beneficiary and the applicant.144 Letters of credit are freely
assignable and beneficiaries will often assign the proceeds of a letter of credit to
finance its performance to the applicant in some way.14 5 Commercial entities
are eager to accept letters of credit as payment because such letters are backed by
the creditworthiness of the issuing bank, which is almost always beyond dispute,
and not the creditworthiness of the applicant.146
When these transactions are made internationally, as they often are in the
shipping industry, the issuing bank will be located in the country in which the
applicant is located and will need to rely on banks in the beneficiary's country to
139. See Triton Container Int'l. Ltd. v. Kien Hung Shipping Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18302, at *8
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2003).
140. U.C.C. § 5-102(10) (1995).
141. Id. at § 5-102(a)(2) (statutorily defined as "a person at whose request or for whose account a letter
of credit is issued. The term includes a person who requests an issuer to issue a letter of credit on behalf of
another if the person making the request undertakes an obligation to reimburse the issuer").
142. Id. at § 5-102(a)(9) (statutorily defined as "a bank or other person that issues a letter of credit ...
143. Id. at § 5-102(a)(3) (statutorily defined as "a person who under the terms of a letter of credit is
entitled to have its complying presentation honored. The term includes a person to whom drawing rights have
been transferred under a transferable letter of credit.").
144. G. Hamp Uzzelle, Letters of Credit, 10 MAR. L. 47,47 (1985).
145. Id. at 49 (adding that letters of credit are also commonly issued in the maritime context o guarantee
payment of charter hire and payment of freight).
146. DAVID M. WEISS, AFTER THE TRADE IS MADE: PROCESSING SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS 391 (3d
ed. 2006); see also Union Planters Nat. Bank v. World Energy Sys. Assoc., 816 F.2d 1092, 1094 (6th Cir.
1987) ("The letter of credit is a commonly used means of payment in international business transactions
because it assures the purchaser that payment will not be affected unless and until the seller has performed, but
it also allows the seller to finance the sale by providing an easily assignable domestic contract right.").
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carry out disbursement of funds under a letter of credit.147 These banks are often
either "advisers"1 48 or "confirmers." 149 In these situations, a beneficiary in a
foreign country will receive payment under a letter of credit by appearing before
the bank indicated in the letter of credit as being responsible for disbursing
funds.150 Letters of credit are also frequently used in the maritime context as a
substitute for a bond or letter of undertaking in order to release a seized vessel or
some other property.151 Parties seeking attachment of letters of credit under
Rule B should be aware that rights under a letter of credit are inchoate until a
beneficiary has complied with all formalities stated in the letter of credit.152
1. The Location of a Letter of Credit
Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code states that, unless the parties
elect otherwise, a letter of credit will be located at the registered address of the
issuer of that letter or at the address of a nominated person under that letter of
credit.153 An issuer or nominated person in a letter-of-credit context will almost
always be a bank or some other financial institution. Article 5 states that a bank
branch is considered a separate entity for jurisdiction and choice-of-law
purposes.154 These provisions are significant because they comport with the
commercial intent of the parties as evidenced in the letter of credit. Therefore, a
maritime plaintiff will need to identify the correct bank branch for attachment of
a letter of credit. In practice, this will be wherever the parties intended for the
letter of credit to be payable to the beneficiary.
An admiralty case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
Union Planters National Bank v. World Energy Systems Associates, illustrates
how Rule B attachment of letters of credit works.155 In that case, the defendant,
World Energy Systems Associates (WESA), was a coal trader who contracted
with a Taiwanese company for shipment of coal; payment was made pursuant to
a letter of credit issued by a Taiwanese bank.156 Union Planters National Bank
in Memphis was designated in the letter of credit as the party to reimburse the
beneficiary.157  Payment under the letter of credit was contingent upon
presentation of documents showing that the contracted-for coal had been
147. See Uzzelle, supra note 144 at 47-48.
148. U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(1) (statutorily defined as "a person who, at the request of the issuer, a confirmer,
or another adviser, notifies or requests another adviser to notify the beneficiary that a letter of credit has been
issued, confirmed, or amended").
149. Id. at § 5-102(a)(4) (statutorily defined as "a nominated person who undertakes, at the request or
with the consent of the issuer, to honor a presentation under a letter of credit issued by another").
150. See Uzzelle, supra note 144 at 47-48.
151. Id. at 49.
152. Daikan Love, S.A. v. Al-Haddas Bros. Enter., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 782, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating
that letters of credit are executory contracts until all documents have been presented in accordance with the
terms of the letter of credit and executory contracts are not attachable res); accord Reibor Int'l, Ltd., 759 F.2d
at 266; see also Sisalcords Do Brazil, Ltd. v. Fiacao Brasiliera De Sisal, S.A., 450 F.2d 419, 423 (5th Cir.
1971).
153. U.C.C. §5-116(b) (1995).
154. Id. (essentially adopting the Separate Entity Rule from New York).
155. 816 F.2d 1092 (6th Cir. 1987).
156. Id. at 1093-94.
157. Id. at 1094.
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properly loaded aboard ships bound for Taiwan.158 Plaintiffs, Texas Chartering
and Hemmert International, were creditors of WESA and served a Rule B writ of
attachment upon Union Planters in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee to secure WESA's appearance there.159 At the time of
attachment, WESA had not presented documents to Union Planters in
conformity with the terms of the letter of credit and, as a result, the issuing bank
in Taiwan had not disbursed any funds to Union Planters.160 The issue was
whether attachment of the letter of credit was proper given that funds had not
actually been disbursed.16 1  The court held that attachment was improper
because the issuing bank had not transmitted funds to Union Planters in
Memphis, and thus no attachable res existed in that district.162
For purposes of this Article, Union Planters is instructive because the court
does not dispute that attachment in the Western District of Tennessee would
have been proper had funds under the letter of credit actually been disbursed to a
bank in that district at the time of attachment.163  The case supports the
proposition that attachment of a letter of credit is appropriate wherever the party
designated in the letter of credit to disburse funds to the beneficiary is located.
In all probability, this will be the specific bank branch designated to disburse
funds under the relevant letter of credit.
2. Summary of Letters of Credit
Letters of credit are valuable instruments in maritime commerce. Letters of
credit can be attached wherever the bank branch authorized by the terms of that
letter to disburse funds is located. Maritime plaintiffs should be advised that all
formalities under a letter of credit must be complied with before attachable res
will be found to exist.
E. Negotiable Instruments
Negotiable instruments under commercial law constitute an additional type
of intangible property that may be attachable in admiralty under Rule B.
Negotiable instruments are a form of "commercial paper" and are governed by
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Negotiable instruments include
bank drafts, promissory notes, cashier's checks, bills of exchange, and (in
admiralty) bills of lading.164 Fundamentally, these instruments involve an
obligation between one person to pay another (in the case of "notes"), or an
obligation between one person to pay another person via a third party, usually a
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1093-94.
160. Id. at 1094-95.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1097.
163. Id. at 1098. A separate issue in this case involved the fact that WESA had assigned proceeds under
the letter of credit to a number of other creditors in advance of the funds arriving in this case and the court
stated that, even if funds had properly arrived, attachment would not have worked because the res had already
been assigned to other parties.
164. U.C.C. § 3-104 (2002).
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bank (in the case of "drafts").1 65
Negotiable instruments are critical to global commerce because they
facilitate an easy and reliable transfer of goods in exchange for payment. Key to
the success of these instruments is their "negotiability." For a commercial
instrument to be "negotiable" it must constitute a (a) signed (b) writing that
states (c) an unconditional (d) promise or order (e) to pay a set amount of money
(f) to an order or bearer (g) on demand or at a definite time and which (h)
contains no other undertakings or requirements.166 Another key aspect of
transferability is the "holder in due course" doctrine, which states that (a) a
holder (b) of a negotiable instrument that appears complete and authentic (c)
who took the instrument in an ordinary transaction (d) for value (e) in good faith
and (f) without notice of any defects in the instrument shall be entitled to all
rights in the instrument and shall pass along those same rights to subsequent
transferees. 167
In the maritime industry, the most prominent negotiable instrument is the
order bill of lading. Bills of lading are instruments that evidence three legal
relationships: (1) a receipt documenting the physical transfer of goods from a
shipper to a carrier, (2) a contract of carriage between the shipper and the carrier,
and (3) a document representing title to the goods being transferred.168 in
contrast to a "straight" bill of lading, which is a mere document of title and is not
negotiable,169 an "order" bill of lading satisfies the requirements for
negotiability under Article 3 if it (a) runs to the order of a named consignee and
(b) does not state on its face that it is non-negotiable.170 "Straight" bills of
lading are printed on white paper and "order" bills of lading are printed on
yellow paper. 171
In a typical transaction utilizing a bill of lading, a buyer of goods instructs a
bank to open a letter of credit with the seller's bank.172 The carrier of those
goods issues a bill of lading upon receiving the goods, and the bill of lading
becomes part of the goods document package.173 The seller then takes the bill of
lading to its own bank where the buyer's letter of credit was previously opened
and offers the bill for cash.174 The seller's bank sends the bill of lading to the
165. STEPHEN C. VELTRI, THE ABCS OF THE UCC: ARTICLE 3 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS & ARTICLE 4
BANK DEPOSITS & COLLECTIONS (Amelia H. Boss, ed., 1997) at 7.
166. U.C.C. § 3-104(a).
167. U.C.C. § 3-302; see also VELTRI, supra note 163 at 3.
168. See Richard Brett Kelly, The CMI Charts a Course of the Sea of Electronic Sea Interchange: Rules
for Electronic Bills of Lading, 16 TUL. MAR. L.J. 349, 351 (1992); see also Emmanuel T. Laryea, Paperless
Shipping Documents: An Australian Perspective, 25 TUL. MAR. L.J. 255, 268 (2000).
169. See U.C.C. § 7-104 (2003).
170. 49 U.S.C. § 80103(a) (2012); see also U.C.C. § 7-104(1); see also 22 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §
59:9 (4th ed.) (2014) (general information on bills of lading in maritime commerce). Note that order bills of
lading can be negotiable in the United States because an indorsee of a bill of lading can obtain an abstract of
title that is superior to that of the original holder. See Com. Savings Bank of Grand Rapids v. Mann, 206 A.D.
297 (N.Y. App. Div. 1923). This would not be true under the law of the United Kingdom or Australia. See
Laryea, supra note 168 at 269.
171. See Estherville Produce Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P.I., Co., 57 F.2d 50, 53 (8th Cir. 1932).
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buyer's bank and receives cash in exchange.175 The buyer's bank then notifies
the buyer who claims the bill of lading by cash payment.176 The buyer in
possession of the bill of lading thus has legal title to the goods and takes delivery
from the carrier.177
This transaction is frequently accomplished in the modem day via use of an
"electronic bill of lading," which is extremely attractive to shipping companies
due to the lack of paper assets that can become lost or stolen.178 The Comit6
Maritime International (CMI) devised a set of rules to govern transactions
utilizing electronic bills of lading more than 25 years ago.179 In an electronic
bill of lading transaction, the parties will typically agree initially to be bound by
the CMI Rules.180 The shipper will then transfer goods to the carrier and the
carrier will transmit notice of receipt of the goods to a shipper's "electronic
address," which fulfills the essential functions of a paper bill of lading.181 This
receipt must contain certain terms, including, inter alia, a "Private Key" that will
allow the holder of the bill to transact future sales or transfers of ownership of
the goods.182 Once the shipper comes into possession of the "Private Key," it
becomes the holder of all rights in the goods being shipped.183 The holder is
then free to sell the goods to a buyer, but the holder must transfer its rights to the
buyer once the sale is complete.184 The carrier must next notify the holder of the
expected date and time of delivery, and the holder must notify the carrier if the
consignee of the goods is someone else.185
1. Rule B Attachment of Negotiable Instruments
Negotiable instruments, specifically bills of lading (in either paper or
electronic form), present a number of problems for plaintiffs hoping to attach
such instruments under Rule B. The primary problem, given a negotiable
instrument's nature as a documentary intangible representing a legal relationship
between parties, is the location of such an instrument. The intuitive answer is
wherever the instrument itself can be located, but such an approach conflicts
with various choice-of-law analyses governing negotiable instruments. Those
instruments have held that the law of negotiable instruments varies from the law




178. Kelly, supra note 168 at 353.
179. See Comit6 Maritime International, Rules for Electronic Bills of Lading (Mar. 22, 2016, 5:22 PM),
http://comtemaritime.org/Rules-for-Electronic-Bills-of-Lading/0,2728,12832,00.html [hereinafter CMI].
180. Kelly, supra note 168 at 362.
18 1. Id.
182. See CMI, supra note 179 at Rule 7.
183. Id. at Rule 7(a)(1) (stating that the holder is the only person with the right to take possession of the
goods upon delivery at their destination).
184. Id. at Rule 7(b).
185. Id. at Rule 9(a).
186. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg v. Alexander, 728 F. Supp. 192, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(applying Texas law).
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execution or delivery' 87 to the law of the location at the time of transfer" to
simply the law of the place with the most significant relationship to the
instrument.189
In keeping with the overall theme of this Article, it can be conceived that
order bills of lading are located wherever they can be freely disposed. As
negotiable instruments, order bills of lading can therefore be thought to be
located wherever their holder can be found. Article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code places a great deal of emphasis on the union of the negotiable
instrument and the holder. The instrument itself is of key significance and rights
contained within that instrument are only capable of being utilized by the holder
of that instrument. Order bills of lading are also bearer paper and, therefore, the
physical location of the instrument is of prime importance.
If the bill of lading is a paper document, its location will be wherever the
physical piece of paper is located. If the bill of lading is electronic, the "bill of
lading" will come into existence upon satisfactory completion of an electronic
receipt and should be considered located wherever the party with rights
thereunder is physically located. In practice, in either a paper or electronic
scenario, the initial holder of a bill of lading will be the shipper,190 and the
shipper is free to transfer its rights under the bill of lading to any other party. So
whether a bill of lading exists in documentary or electronic form, the rights
thereunder exist wherever the holder of those rights is physically located. In this
sense, the bill of lading itself exists wherever the holder of the rights thereunder
is located. That location will be the location of the shipper or the location of any
transferee of the shipper's rights under the bill of lading.
This scenario will present obvious problems for Rule B attachment because
the holder of an order bill of lading is also the person with rights to goods
represented in the bill of lading, and a Rule B plaintiff cannot attach property if
the "owner" of that property is also found in that judicial district.19 1 But if a
plaintiff seeks to compel another party to a shipping transaction - for example,
the original shipper who has transferred the order bill of lading to another party
but who still intends to take possession of the shipped goods at some point-to
appear, attachment of order bills of lading, as negotiable instruments under Rule
B, may be an attractive prospect.
2. Summary of Negotiable Instruments
Negotiable instruments are most commonly utilized in the maritime
industry in the form of order bills of lading. These bills of lading are attachable
res under Rule B and are attachable wherever the rights thereunder are freely
disposable by their holder. In practice, this will be wherever the holder itself is
187. Wallen v. Loving, 609 F. Supp. 159, 161 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (applying Illinois law).
188. See generally Capital Investors Co. v. Executors of Morrison's Estate, 484 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir.
1973) (applying Virginia law).
189. Devine v. Meyer Assocs., 60 A.D.2d 592 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (applying New York law).
190. See CMI, supra note 179 at Rules 4(b)(i), 7(a).
191. The very purpose of Rule B attachment is to compel the appearance of an absent defendant before a
court. This rule is therefore irrelevant if that defendant is already physically within the territorial jurisdiction of
that court.
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physically located.
F. Intellectual Property Rights
A final, and indeed novel, category of intangible property that may be
attached under Rule B is intellectual property rights. Intellectual property entails
the classic trio of copyright, trademark, and patent rights, in addition to things
such as domain names, design patents, and so forth.192 Intellectual property
rights grant the right holder a monopoly over a particular work that qualifies for
protection under intellectual property laws. The force of federal law in the
United States supports this monopoly right.193 This right primarily entails the
right to exclude others from using a right holder's intellectual property and, in
this regard, is not distinct from any other type of property.
Intellectual property rights are created, either by registration with a federal
office (i.e., with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for patents and
trademarks),194 or by fulfillment of certain statutory requirements (i.e., for
copyright, by creating "[an] original [work] of authorship fixed in a tangible
medium of expression").19 5 By granting these protections at the federal level,
the United States government indicates that intellectual property rights are
enforceable by the right holder anywhere within the legal boundaries of the
United States.
1. Rule B Attachment of Intellectual Property
The question of whether intellectual property rights are attachable under
Rule B is uncharted territory: this author is aware of no attempt to attach this
kind of property in admiralty. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
classifies, however, intellectual property rights as "general intangibles," which
suggests that the law anticipates that such rights can be encumbered by a security
interest.196 Bankruptcy courts have held that security interests can be attached to
intellectual property rights.19 7 This would suggest that intellectual property
rights can be subject to other forms of legal encumbrance, such as maritime
192. See DAVID LINDSAY, INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN NAME LAW (2007) (providing an examination of
the international treatment of domain names).
193. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 ("Congress shall have Power ... To Promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing, for limited Times, to Authors and Inventors, the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries"); 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (Copyright Act); 35 U.S.C. § I et seq. (Patent
Act); 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (Lanham Act).
194. 35 U.S.C. § 21 et seq.; 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.
195. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); see also Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805
F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986). Note that while copyright itself can vest in the United States by mere compliance
with statutory requirements, copyrights are only enforceable if they are registered with the U.S. Copyright
Office. In most jurisdictions other than the United States, copyrights are enforceable whether or not they are
registered. See JAMES FAWCETT & PAUL TORREMANS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INT'L LAW
(2d ed. 2011) (including information on international copyright protections); see also MIREILLE VAN EECHOUD,
CHOICE OF LAW IN COPYRIGHT & RELATED RIGHTS: ALTERNATIVES TO THE LEX PROTECTIONIS (2003)
(same).
196. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) (2010).
197. See In re Coldwave Systems LLC, 368 B.R. 91, 97 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (stating that an Article 9
security interest can be perfected against a patent, as a general intangible, only by filing a financing statement
against that patent).
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attachment under Rule B.
Assuming that intellectual property rights can be attached under Rule B, the
issue arises as to where a maritime plaintiff would find intellectual property
rights in order to file an attachment action against them. For example, assume
that a plaintiff wanted to attach Maersk's trademark in the United States to
recover for unpaid bunker oil. Where would this plaintiff find Maersk's
trademark to attach it?
Three possibilities seem to exist: (1) where the right is enforceable (i.e., in
our hypothetical, wherever Maersk can prevent someone else from using its
trademark), (2) where the right is registered (i.e., Alexandria, Virginia, where the
Patent and Trademark Office is physically located) (or, in the case of copyright,
where the substance of the copyrightable material is located), or (3) where the
right itself can be found for personal jurisdiction (i.e., wherever Maersk can be
said to be "using" its trademark, which, in practical terms, could be just about
anywhere). In reality, only the first option makes sense. The United States
government, through its registration system, is stating that the holder of an
intellectual property right (here, Maersk) can prevent others from using its
property anywhere in the United States. Theoretically, the right holder can go to
court anywhere in the country to enforce its rights. In this sense, intellectual
property rights exist everywhere in the United States in equal measure, and it
would make sense, on that basis, that they can be attached anywhere.
This possibility is particularly compelling for maritime plaintiffs. In the
example used above, Maersk's trademark is certainly property of Maersk-
Maersk itself is not necessarily located in every district in the United States for
jurisdiction or for service of process, but its trademark theoretically exists in
every district in the United States. If this theory is correct, it would make
intellectual property rights unique among intangibles for Rule B purposes.
Hypothetically, the bunker oil plaintiff here could attach Maersk's trademark in
the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, a district in
which Maersk is unlikely to be found in personam and a district that has rarely,
if ever, attached any property of Maersk under Rule B. This may be a
particularly shrewd technique for future users of Rule B attachment.
2. Summary of Intellectual Property
Given the federal nature of intellectual property rights in the United States,
attachment of intellectual property rights of all kinds could be made in any
district court in the United States.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis in this Article surveys likely attachment locations
for corporate shares, bank accounts, letters of credit, negotiable instruments, and
intellectual property rights. Case law relating to electronic fund transfers was
included in this analysis because, while the attachment of electronic fund
transfers has been outlawed in the Second Circuit, the location of these fund
transfers nonetheless sheds light on the location of other commonly used types
of intangible property. The locations of intangible property mentioned above
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reiterate the rule of thumb mentioned in heading II of this Article: Intangible
property is located wherever it can be utilized or disposed of by the right holder.
No reason exists to think that this rule is not applicable to Rule B of the
Supplemental Rules of Admiralty.
This Article's inquiry into the location of intangible property will be helpful
for maritime practitioners given the increasing use of intangible assets as money
in the maritime industry.198 In addition, this industry is becoming increasingly
more complex, in part due to the rise of alter egos.199 As a result, Rule B
attachment will continue to be a powerful tool to compel appearances by
maritime parties and to secure increasingly mobile assets in maritime commerce.
198. See Uzelle, supra note 144 at 70.
199. See Vitol, S.A. v. Primerose Shipping Co., Ltd., 708 F.3d 527 (4th Cir. 2013).
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